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Abstract
In 1500, Europe was composed of hundreds of statelets and principalities, with weak central
authority, no monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, and multiple, overlapping levels of
jurisdiction. By 1800, Europe had consolidated into a handful of powerful, centralized nation
states. We build a model that simultaneously explains both the emergence of capable states and
growing divergence between European powers. In our model, the impact of war on the European
state system depends on: i) the importance of money for determining the war outcome (which
stands for the cost of war), and ii) a country￿ s initial level of domestic political fragmentation.
We emphasize the role of the ￿Military Revolution￿ , which raised the cost of war. Initially, this
caused more internally cohesive states to invest more in state capacity, while other (more divided)
states rationally dropped out of the competition. This mechanism leads to both increasing
divergence between European states, and greater average investments in state building on the
continent overall.
11 Introduction
Capable states cannot be taken for granted. A new research program on state capacity argues that
creating an e⁄ective tax system is a costly and uncertain investment (Besley and Persson 2011).
States with a centralized career bureaucracy, controlling a signi￿cant share of national output, are
a recent innovation. For most of mankind￿ s history, there was no highly centralized apparatus that
could assert a monopoly over the legimitate use of violence, collecting vast revenues, administering
justice, and employing huge numbers of civil servants and armed men. Most scholars agree that
states as we know them today begin to appear after 1500 in Europe. Then, the continent was divided
into more than 500 ￿states, would-be states, statelets, and state-like organizations￿(Tilly 1990).
Rulers possessed limited tax powers; there was no professional bureaucracy; hiring mercenaries was
the principal way to obtain armed force; and powerful elites were often above the law. And yet,
within three short centuries European powers managed to pull ahead of the rest of the world.
The leading explanation for this development emphasizes the role of warfare. As Charles Tilly
(1990) argued, ￿states made war, and war made states￿ . War gave monarchs the incentive to create
an e⁄ective ￿scal infrastructure ￿in a belligerent environment, the ability to ￿nance war is key to
survival. Besley and Persson (2009) build a model of the government￿ s decision to invest in ￿scal
capacity. They ￿nd that such investment is more pronounced when a common interest (rather than
a distributive) public good has to be ￿nanced. Their model therefore provides a link between war
and state capacity precisely when warmaking is perceived as a common interest public good.
This perspective helps to explain the coexistence of frequent warfare and growing state capacity
in some European states after 1600. At the same time, four important issues remain. First, warfare
is not unique to either Europe or the early modern period. States mostly failed to develop much
before 1600 despite frequent warfare, contradicting the view that war will necessarily translate into
state building. For example, hunter-gatherer communities registered high rates of violent death
(Clark 2007), but did not engage in state building on any signi￿cant scale. Why do modern states
emerge in a small corner of the Eurasian landmass after 1500? Second, the growth in state capacity
was highly uneven, with some powers such as Britain or France building stronger and bigger states,
others such as Spain or Austria falling behind, and some, like Poland, disappearing altogether. If
war boosted state building in some countries, it must have had a smaller (or even the opposite
e⁄ect) in others. Currently, the literature on state capacity is silent on growing divergence in the
cross-section. Third, warfare during the period of initial state building (1500-1800) was rarely a
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pursuit of glory and personal power, with ￿nancing often met with heavy resistance by domestic
taxpayers. Fourth, and crucially, wars are not exogenous events. Instead, rulers deliberately decide
to go to war. They do so partly in response to a country￿ s existing ability to wage the war
successfully. Thus, having a strong state may be the cause, and not the consequence, of war.
This paper addresses these issues by building a model of military con￿ ict and state building.
In the model, which is presented in Section 2, two contending rulers choose the centralization
of their tax system by taking the prospect of military con￿ ict into account. Centralization is
our measure of state capacity, and captures the extent to which the ruler - as opposed to local
powerholders - controls taxes and their collection. Military con￿ ict is a costly mechanism (￿nanced
with taxes) that redistributes future ￿scal revenues from the loser to the winner. In this setup,
greater centralization: i) allows a ruler to collect more ￿scal revenues (and win wars more often),
but it also ii) requires the ruler to spend resources to sideline domestic powerholders, who lose
under centralization. In this sense, state building entails a domestic political cost. We ￿rst study
this tradeo⁄ in the simplest case where war is an exogenous event. Section 5 considers the case
where, after having centralized, each ruler chooses whether or not to go to war.
Sections 3 and 4 study the model, showing that the impact of war on state building depends on
two parameters. The ￿rst one is the importance of money for determining military might. When
the creation of an e⁄ective military apparatus depends on large ￿nancial investments, wars are
costly and the ability to raise ￿scal revenues is a key strategic asset. The second parameter is
the relative political fragmentation of war contenders. Ceteris paribus, state building will be more
costly for the rulers of internally more divided states.
When the importance of money (and thus the cost of war) is low we ￿nd that - contrary to Tilly￿ s
hypothesis - the presence of military con￿ ict dampens state building compared to a peaceful world.
The intuition is that in this case both contenders are similarly likely to win the war regardless of
their ￿scal revenues. As a result, war only creates the risk for a ruler of losing ￿scal revenues,
reducing his gains from building a more e⁄ective tax apparatus. Additionally, given that the odds
of victory are even, weak rulers have a relatively larger incentive to go to war against strong ones
in a bid to grab the ￿scal revenues of the latter. Due to these e⁄ects, when war is cheap, frequent
warfare and the presence of weak states endogenously reinforce each other.
When instead the importance of money (and thus the cost of war) is high, the possibility of
military con￿ ict boosts state capacity in cohesive countries but hinders it in divided countries.
3This causes strong divergence in state building. Indeed, given the importance of money, the odds
of winning the war are stacked in favour of the stronger state. As a result, divided states that ￿nd
it costly to centralize rationally drop out of the competition ￿their chances of success are too low.
In contrast, cohesive states do not only engage in state building but they also aggressively attack
(and conquer) divided ones. Warfare is still frequent, but now it coexists with the consolidation of
strong, cohesive states while weak, divided ones gradually lose out.
Historically, the growth of state capacity was often associated with the emergence of institutions
limiting the prerogatives of central rulers, particularly with respect to taxation (Dincecco 2009).
To shed light on these patterns, Section 5 endogenizes a ruler￿ s incentive to let such institutions
develop. We ￿nd that in our model, institutional constraints act as a means of reducing a ruler￿ s
domestic opposition and thus the cost of state building. In the presence of institutions constraining
the ruler, state building becomes a common interest public good. As a result, we ￿nd that insti-
tutional constraints will emerge if a ruler aggressively engages in state building but not otherwise.
This ￿nding underlines the conditions under which di⁄erent aspects of state e⁄ectiveness tend to
complement each other (Besley and Persson 2011).
In Section 6 we use our model to examine why state-building took o⁄ in Europe after 1500.
Our model predicts that frequent warfare is not su¢ cient for powerful states to emerge. Military
con￿ ict had to become costly, and internal cohesion of some of the competing powers needed to be
relatively high. Our analysis therefore supports the view that the ￿military revolution￿dramatically
reshaped Europe￿ s political landscape (Downing 1992). The term ￿military revolution￿is used to
capture a set of interrelated technological and organizational changes occurring between the 16th
and 17th century that made wars more costly and protracted (e.g., Roberts 1956). Our analysis
suggests that this technological change played a crucial role by raising the cost of warfare, changing
the bene￿ts of state building. Before the 16th century the relatively low cost of war may have been
responsible for the lack of state building; thereafter, the military revolution created a ￿race to the
top￿for those powers starting with low levels of domestic fragmentation, while it sti￿ ed the state
building of divided countries as their chances of success dwindled. The growing divergence in state
capacity in turn accentuated the incentive of stronger powers to go to war, o⁄ering an explanation
for why growing di⁄erences in state capacity went hand-in-hand with ever more frequent military
con￿ ict. States such as Britain or France succeeded in this highly competitive environment, and
came to command resources and centralized administrative control on an impressive scale. Divided
and weak states such as Poland failed to do so, and disappeared from the map.
4There is a vast literature studying the origins of growth-promoting institutions. Important
contributions include Acemoglu (2005), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2004, 2005); North
(1989); Greif (1993). This literature does not explicitly consider the role of external con￿ ict, but it
sometimes argues that that war can overcome domestic agency problems that stand in the way of
better institutions (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). There is also a growing literature studying
the causes and consequences of interstate con￿ ict (Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008, Morelli and
Jackson 2007, Spolaore and Wacziarg 2010, Yared 2010). This literature studies who ￿ghts whom,
how often, and with what intensity. A typical question considered is: ￿Do democracies ￿ght
each other less often?￿Intra-state con￿ ict is the explicandum, but the institutional features that
determine the results are treated as exogenous. Our work uni￿es these literatures by examining the
joint determinans of military con￿ icts and institutional structure and how they co-evolve. Lagerlof
(2011) analyzes the role of the military revolution in allowing Europe to catch up and overtake
China, technologically, but he does not analyze state building patterns.
We also relate to the large literature on taxation and the growth of the state in Europe after
1500 (Tilly 1990, Brewer 1988, Bonney ). Countries with parliamentary representation typically
had higher tax rates than those governed by princes (Ho⁄man and Norberg 1994, Mathias and
O￿ Brien 1976, Ho⁄man and Rosenthal 1997). The statistical evidence is analysed inter alia by
Dincecco (2009). Stasavage (2003, 2005) analyses coalition formation within countries that may
favor the development of public credit. These studies generally show that representative assemblies
were better at taxing themselves, as re￿ ected in lower interest rates. Dincecco (2009) also ￿nds that
centralization and representation enabled the highest rates of taxation, while the combination of
fragmentation and unconstrained rulers was associated with low tax collection. The arrangements
that allowed representative assemblies and the ruler to struck a bargain is explored in Ho⁄man
and Rosenthal (1997). Our work rationalizes these ￿ndings but also points out that taxation, insti-
tutions and military con￿ ict cannot be separately analyzed because they are jointly endogenously
determined.
2 Historical Background and Context
How did Europe after 1500 create the predecessors of modern-day states? The leading explanation
emphasizes the role of war and the need to build more capable structures in a bid for survival
(Tilly 1990). Wars were indeed frequent in early modern Europe (table 1). The data collected by
5Levy (1983) show that in Europe between 1500 to 1700, a Great Power war was underway in 95%
of all years (Table 1). Up to 70% of the European population was a⁄ected by war at any one point
in time.
Table 1 here
We argue that this is more of a puzzle than an answer. In Table 1, the frequency of wars was if
anything higher in the 16th century than in the 17th centuries, when state consolidation started.
Numerous, extended wars were also fought during the medieval period, from the reconquista in
Spain to the Hundred Years War between England and France and to innumerable wars between
Italian city states. War is also not unique to Europe. China, for example, experienced prolonged
con￿ ict during the ￿warring states period￿ , between 475BC and 221BC (Hui 2005). In neither
medieval Europe nor early China did frequent warfare coincide with the creation of highly capable
and centralized governance structures.
If take the number of major battles fought in Europe between the 7th and the 18th century as
an indicator of the intensity of warfare, there is a strong upward trend since the early Middle Ages,
but there is no major discontinuity in the 16th century that would justify a sudden acceleration of
state building [see Figure 1, built from Jacque (2007)].
Figure 1 here
Our answer to the puzzle is that aggressive state building was due to a unique synergy be-
tween military con￿ ict and exogenous changes in the military technology, the so-called ￿military
revolution￿ . Before spelling out how this mechanism works, this section brie￿ y describes our ex-
planandum ￿the rise in state capacity in early modern Europe ￿and our explanatory factor, the
military revolution.
2.1 The building of state capacity in Europe after 1500
Two facts are striking about the rise of state capacity in Europe after 1500. One is the sheer
magnitude of the increase in state centralization, tax capacity, and military ability over time. The
second is the growing degree of divergence between European states.
Figure 2 gives an overview of a simple indicator of state capacity (Besley and Persson 2011) ￿
total tax revenue of the major European powers, in tons of silver per year. We plot change over
6time, to capture the speed of the increase. All the major European powers for which we have data
in 1500 generated combined revenue of 214 tons p.a. Some 280 years later, this had increased by a
factor of twenty, to 4,400 tons p.a. Part of the total increase re￿ ected growing population numbers,
but an important part re￿ ects higher tax pressure. Measured in grams of silver per head and year,
average ￿scal revenue increased eight-fold between 1500 and 1780.1 The second aspect that clearly
emerges from Figure 2 is growing di⁄erence between European powers. In 1500, Poland￿ s total
revenue was half of England￿ s. In 1780, it was equivalent to 5%. Some powers only increased their
tax revenue by a small margin, others by a lot. Venetian tax receipts doubled during the course of
the early modern period, while those of England surged by a factor of 78.
Figure 2 here
The vast increase in revenue was facilitated by a di⁄erent administrative structure. Medieval
rulers had largely been expected to ￿ live on their own￿ , i.e. to ￿nance themselves from their domain
income (Landers 2003). After 1500, this became impossible. To raise large amounts of tax, states
needed to centralize, professionalize, and bureaucratize their administration. Overall, states by the
late 18th century had succeeded in this task. By 1780, Britain had centralized, bureaucratized
collection of excise and customs taxes, and was about to introduce the ￿rst successful income tax
in history. France, on the other hand, still used tax farming for both direct and indirect taxes.
There, vast tax exemptions for the nobility and the clergy hamstrung the monarchy￿ s attempts to
raise revenue.
Changes in tax collection were part of a broader pattern of administrative reforms. Ancient
legal privileges in many composite states were being reduced. At the same time, the pace at which
states succeeded in pushing through administrative and political reforms varied greatly. Spain, for
example, had scant success in reducing the fragmentation of its internal market; reforms in Poland
foundered on the unanimity principle in the sejm, the assembly of nobles.
Armies were, on the whole, no longer provided by mercenary entrepreneurs, as they had been
at the beginning of the period. Instead, they were centrally and uniformly equipped from state
arsenals, and o¢ cered by professional soldiers receiving a regular salary. Military capacity also grew
over time, but diverged sharply. By 1780, European armies (excluding Russia and the Ottoman
Empire) had more than a million men under arms. The equivalent ￿gure for 1550 was only 300,000.
1The value of silver declined, but only gradually. The real increase was still by a factor of more than 3.
7Figure 3 puts these changes in long-term perspective. Compared to the armies of Rome and
Byzantium, early modern armies were large (measured as percentage of the population under
arms). Indeed, Sweden in 1700 already reached levels of mobilization similar to those in Europe
during World War I and II.
Figure 3 here
Some powers succeeded in mobilizing resources more than others (see Table 2 below). At one
end of the spectrum, England after 1700 quickly conquered vast parts of the globe. Its armed forces
tripled in size between 1550 and 1780. France￿ s army increased by a factor of ￿ve, and Austria￿ s, by
a factor of 28. In contrast, Poland was partitioned out of existence as a result of military impotence
caused by internal strife and ￿scal weakness.
Table 2 here
2.2 The ￿military revolution￿
During the early modern period, war became much more costly. Changes in military technology
and tactics - referred to by historians as the "Military Revolution" (Roberts 1956; Parker 1996)
￿resulted in a rise in costs. As a result, ￿scal attrition rather than battle￿eld prowess became
the main determinant of success in war. As a Spanish 16th century military commander put it,
￿victory will go to whoever possesses the last escudo" (Parker 1996).
Three changes were responsible for the growing importance of ￿scal revenue for military success
￿gunpowder, new forti￿cations, and the rise of standing armies. The spread of (mobile) cannon
after 1400 meant that medieval walls could be destroyed quickly. Fortresses that had withstood
year-long sieges in the Middle Ages could fall within hours.2 In response, Italian military engineers
devised a new type of forti￿cation -- the trace italienne. It consisted of large earthen bulwarks,
clad with brick, which could withstand cannon￿re. These new forti￿cations were immensely costly
to build.3 The existence of numerous strongpoints meant that wars often dragged on even longer ￿
winning a battle was no longer enough to control a territory. Roger Boyle, the British soldier and
statesman observed in the 1670s (Parker 1996):
2The Neapolitan fortress of Monte San Giovanni had withstood medieval sieges for up to seven years; Charles
VIII￿ s artillery breached its walls in a matter of hours (Du⁄y 1996).
3The fortress of Besancon was so expensive that when informed of the total cost, Louis XIV asked if the walls had
been made of gold (Parker 1996).
8Battells do not now decide national quarrels, and expose countries to the pillage of
conquerors, as formerly. For we make war more like foxes, more than lyons; and you
will have 20 sieges for one battell.
The introduction and growth of standing armies is the third main element of the ￿military
revolution￿ (Roberts 1956; Parker 1996). Due to the needs for ￿rearms training, states began
to organize, equip, and drill soldiers, investing in their human capital. Starting with reforms
introduced by William of Nassau during the Dutch rebellion, soldiers were garrisoned and trained
continuously.
At the same time, states began to organize permanent navies. While the English had beaten the
Spanish Armada in 1588 with an assortment of re￿tted merchant vessels, navies now became highly
professionalized, with large numbers of warships kept in readiness for the next con￿ ict. Investments
in naval dockyards, victualling yards, and ships were costly. Even smaller ships in the English navy
of the 18th century cost more than the largest industrial companies had in capital (Brewer 1988).
Forti￿cations, artillery, and ever-larger, better-equipped, and professional standing armies and
navies made war an increasingly costly pursuit. The expenses of medieval campaigns had often
been met by requisitioning and through the feudal service obligations of medieval knights. After
1500, the business of war was increasingly transacted in cash and credit, and not in feudal dues.4
The late Middle Ages and the early modern period saw the increasing use of debt ￿nancing. During
wartime, 80% and more of government expenditure would regularly be devoted to military costs.
Military spending could exceed the sum of all tax revenues in a single year ￿ by 50% in some
extreme cases, such as Habsburg Spain during the 1570s (Bean 1973).
3 The Basic Model
We now present a model shedding light on the link between state building and the military revo-
lution. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the role of centralization. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 describe the
tradeo⁄ faced by a ruler in deciding whether to centralize or not when there is no external war
threat and when such threat is present.
4 Landers (2003). Some have argued that the true increase in the cost of war after 1500 was correspondingly less
(Thompson 1995). This is unlikely ￿indirect social costs probably grew in line with war frequency and army size.
93.1 Production
There are three dates t = 0;1;2. A country consists of a measure 1 of identical districts, each of
which is inhabited by a density 1 of agents who are risk neutral and do not discount the future.
They obtain utility by consuming the only (perishable) good produced in the economy. In each
period, an agent can undertake either local (l) or market (m) production. Local production yields
output Al and occurs in an agent￿ s own district. Market production is more pro￿table but requires
an agent to carry out some steps of the production process (e.g. input purchases) in a neighboring
district.5 If agent j undertakes market production he obtains Am > Al. Agents may also engage
in home production (h), the least pro￿table activity (Ah < Al). If a share nx of agents undertakes
activity x = l;m;h, where nm + nl + nh = 1, the country￿ s total output is equal to:
Y = nmAm + nlAl + nhAh. (1)
Output is maximized when all agents engage in market production (i.e. nm = 1).
3.2 State Building, Taxation and Output
A self-interested ruler ￿nances his expenditures by taxing local and market production. There are
no ￿nancial markets, so the ruler cannot borrow or lend.6 Home production cannot be taxed, and
tax collection depends on the degree of centralization.
Consider ￿rst a fully centralized country. The ruler optimally sets country-wide taxes (￿l;￿m)
where ￿x is the tax on activity x = l;m. Since market production yields greater surplus than
local production, the optimal tax rates (￿￿
l ;￿￿
m): i) discourage local and home production, and ii)











5We assume that districts i 2 [0;1] are located around a circle and that market production is spatially ordered:
each agent undertaking market production in a district i must carry out one step of production in the immediately
left-adjacent district. This assumption simpli￿es the analysis of taxation under partial centralization.
6Our results go through even if the ruler can access ￿nancial markets provided these markets are imperfect.
10The ruler￿ s revenue is then equal to:
Rc = Am ￿ Ah. (4)
In this equilibrium, everybody produces for the market (i.e., nm = 1) and the ruler extracts the
resulting surplus Am ￿ Ah.
Consider now the opposite benchmark of a fully decentralized country. The administration of
each district i is delegated to a local power holder (e.g., a nobleman) who sets taxes (￿l;i;￿m;i) on
local and market production. There are two key di⁄erences with respect to centralization. First,
market production initiated in district i is now taxed also in the other district i0 where it occurs
(see footnote 5). As a result, the total tax rate levied on a producer operating in districts i and




and the producer￿ s net income is (1 ￿ ￿m;i ￿ ￿m;i0)Am. Second, we
assume that control over taxation allows each local power holder to keep a share ￿ of tax revenues
for himself, while handing the remaining share (1 ￿ ￿) of taxes to the central ruler.
The appendix proves that in a symmetric equilibrium where each power holder non-cooperatively
sets optimal taxes (￿l;d;￿m;d) we have:
Lemma 1 There always exist symmetric Nash equilibria where all decentralized districts set ￿l;d =
(Al￿Ah)=Ah and ￿m;d > (Al￿Ah)=2Ah. In these equilibria, everybody engages in local production.
Decentralized districts over-tax and thus discourage market production. The problem is that
taxation of market production by competing power-holders creates a negative ￿overgrazing￿exter-
nality: local power holders try to steal revenue from each other by setting a large a tax on market
production in their district. The resulting volume of market activity is too low. Decentralization
distorts production and tax revenues below the ￿rst best. In the remainder, we take the ine¢ cient
equilibrium of Lemma 1 as the decentralization benchmark.7 In such equilibrium, in each decen-
tralized district total production is Yd = Al, the ruler￿ s revenues are Rd = (1 ￿ ￿)(Al ￿ Ah), and
the revenue Pd remaining with the local power holder is equal to:
Pd = ￿ ￿ (Al ￿ Ah). (5)
Decentralization reduces the ruler￿ s revenues both by reducing output (as Yd < Yc) and by allowing
7The logic of Lemma 1 ia that the ruler of each district may prefer to overtax and thus discourage market production
(by setting a high ￿m;d) so as to encourage local production and appropriate all the surplus it generates. In principle,
there is also an equilibrium where all decentralized power holders magically coordinate to tax market production at
￿m;d = (Am￿Ah)=2Ah so that output and tax revenues are ￿rst best. One can rule out such equilibrium by assuming
that the return to market production is heterogenoeus among agents.
11local power holders to keep a fraction of taxes for themselves (as ￿ > 0). This latter e⁄ect shapes
the political resistance of power holders to the ruler￿ s centralizing e⁄orts.
Having studied full centralization and decentralization, consider the intermediate case of a
partially centralized country where only a measure ￿ 2 (0;1] of districts are centralized. Much as
in a fully centralized country, the ruler internalizes the surpuls generated across the ￿ centralized
districts, setting the uniform tax rates (￿￿
l ;￿￿
m) in all of them and collecting the resulting ￿scal
revenues. The centralized part of the country is equivalent to a fully centralized country consisting
of ￿ < 1 districts.8 As a result, in each centralized district output and tax revenues are respectively
equal to Yc = Am and Rc. By contrast, in the (1 ￿ ￿) decentralized districts local power holders
continue to control tax collection. As in the previous analysis, these power holders fail to internalize
the surplus produced across districts. As a result, they overtax market production, each setting
the tax rates (￿l;d;￿m;d) of Lemma 1.
The combination of centralized and decentralized districts implies that in our model total output
and the ruler￿ s tax revenues as a function of centralization ￿ are equal to:
Y (￿) = Yd ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + Yc ￿ ￿, (6)
R(￿) = Rd ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + Rc ￿ ￿. (7)
In the rest of the analysis we make the following parametric assumption:
A.1: Under decentralization, local power holders keep all tax revenues, i.e. ￿ = 1 (or Rd = 0),
This assumption simpli￿es the analysis because now the ruler￿ s total revenue is equal to:
R(￿) = Rc ￿ ￿, (8)
which is the revenue Rc obtained by the ruler in each centralized district times the measure of
districts that are centralized. This is a convenient expression, but it is important to bear in mind
how Rc, as well as output and the power holders￿rents Pd deped on exogenous parameters.
8Formally, this requires the additional assumption that the ￿ centralized districts form a neighborhood around
the ruler￿ s own original district i = 1=2. Given the spatial pattern of market production described in footnote
6, all market production occurs within centralized districts and only a zero-measure (negligible) amount of market
production occurs between centralized and decentralized districts. We simplify the analysis even further by posing
that no economic activity occurs between centralized and decentralized districts. As a result, a partially centralized
country can be split into a fully centralized and a fully decentralized region.
12This setup seeks to capture the reality of early modern Europe where, before the formation
of strong nation states, tax collection often relied on local representative bodies or noblemen.
These operated through a system of ￿xed-sum payments, regional monopolies and overlapping tax
schemes which sti￿ ed factor mobility and innovation. In this context, centralization allowed for less
distortionary taxation, which generated additional revenues for the monarch while facilitating the
growth of commerce. Using this setup we now endogenize centralization as a function of domestic
and external con￿ icts.
3.3 State Building and Domestic Con￿ ict
At the outset, which we denote t = 0, the ruler chooses the measure ￿ of districts to centralize
(initially centralization is zero, i.e. ￿0 = 0). To do so, he must overcome domestic opposition
by local power holders, because under centralization they lose the ￿control rent￿Pd in (5). This
amounts to a total loss of 2Pd over the two remaining periods t = 1;2. Although as we saw above
centralization increases total tax collection, potentially creating more rents for both the ruler and
power holders, at t = 0 the ruler cannot commit to compensate power holders for losing control of
tax collection (and the resulting rent). This creates opposition to centralization by power holders.
In Section 4, we show how institutions can be precisely viewed as a mechanism alleviating the
ruler￿ s commitment problem and thus power holders￿opposition to reform.
To overcome the opposition to centralization, the ruler needs to spend money. In particular, he
can crush the power holder of district i (or buy him o⁄) by spending an amount ￿i (2Pd) of resources.
Parameter ￿i ￿ 0 proxies for the ability and willingness of power holder i to oppose the ruler, and
is distributed across districts according to c.d.f F(￿), which captures the intensity of domestic
con￿ icts in the country.9 In countries with greater levels of urbanization or religious/linguistic
heterogeneity F(￿) is concentrated on higher values of ￿ so that domestic con￿ ict is more intense.
This admittedly reduced-form formalization of internal con￿ icts allows us to keep the analysis of
external wars tractable.
Given this heterogeneity, the ruler begins to centralize districts with low con￿ ict ￿ and then
9Cost ￿i (2Pd) can be microfounded by assuming that power holder i: a) can commit to spend in a revolt against
the central ruler up to share zi of the control rent 2Pd and that b) this translates into ￿defensive power￿di ￿(zi2Pd),
where di is the productivity of the power holder￿ s defense. By contrast, if the ruler spends an amount Ii, he generates
￿o⁄ensive power￿riIi, where ri is the e⁄ectiveness of the ruler￿ s repression in district i. Here zi may caputre the power
holder￿ s distaste for the central ruler while di=ri proxies his relative strength. If the party with greater (o⁄ensive or
defensive) power wins, the central ruler must spend I
￿
i = zi￿(di=ri)￿(2Pd) to centralize (either by using the resources
in a con￿ ct or by bribing the local power holder, who is assumed to have all the baragining power). By denoting
￿i = zi ￿ (di=ri) this microfoundation maps into our model.
13moves to more hostile districts. The cost of centralizing a measure ￿ of districts is then equal to:




where threshold ￿(￿) de￿nes the resistance faced by the ruler in the marginal district, formally
ful￿lling F [￿(￿)] = ￿. In the remainder we assume:
A.2: ￿ is uniformly distributed in [0;B].
This assumption implies that Equation (9) takes the convenient form:
C(￿) = ￿2 (B ￿ Pd). (10)
The cost of reform is convex because marginal districts are increasingly opposed to reform. The
cost of reform grows with parameter B, which captures the strength of domestic con￿ ict.
Consider the extent of centralization undertaken at t = 0 by the ruler absent any external
threat. We call this regime ￿autarky.￿ At t = 0, the ruler sets ￿ to maximize his utility over
t = 0;1;2. Since there is no borrowing, the ruler ￿nances the reform cost out of a domain income
D > 0 that he receives at t = 0. As a result, the ruler￿ s consumption at t = 0 is equal to D￿C(￿).
The ruler￿ s consumption at t = 1 and t = 2 is instead equal to the ￿scal revenues generated in
these periods.10
It is convenient to view the ruler as choosing the ￿scal revenue R that he can collect at t = 1;2
rather than a level of centralization ￿. Given Equation (8), the ruler￿ s revenue R uniquely pins
down the underlying level of centralization as ￿ = R=Rc. That is the degree of centralization is
equal to the ratio between the revenue R endogenously chosen by the ruler and the maximal revenue
Rc that the ruler could attain by centralizing fully. By plugging ￿ = R=Rc into the cost function








(B ￿ Pd). (11)
The optimal degree of centralization trades o⁄ the bene￿t for the ruler of obtaining ￿scal revenues
10We are implicitly assuming that domain income D is only received at t = 0 and it is su¢ cient to pay for the
reform cost, i.e. D > C(1). This assumption simpli￿es the analysis of state building when external war is present.
Not much would change if the ruler receives D also at t = 1 and at t = 2. In particular, the marginal impact of
centralization on the ruler￿ s ￿scal revenues does not change with D.
142R over t = 1;2 with the cost of curtailing domestic opposition at t = 0. By exploiting (4) and (5),
the optimal reform Raut prevailing under autarky is equal to:







If BPd ￿ Rc, domestic divisions B or power holders￿rents Pd are so low relative to the ruler￿ s
revenue gain Rc that the ruler centralizes fully, setting Raut = Rc (i.e., ￿ = 1). If instead BPd > Rc,
domestic opposition is strong enough that the ruler centralizes only partially, setting Raut < Rc.
Equation (12) says that stronger domestic political con￿ icts (i.e., higher B) reduce the ruler￿ s
ability to extend his power into peripheral areas. This sti￿ es state building. By contrast, state
building increases when centralization generates a larger gain in district-level revenue Rc=Pd, due
for instance to a higher productivity Am=Al of market production. As in early-modern Europe, the
pattern of state formation is shaped by the tension between reaping the bene￿ts from the creation
of a national market (proxied by Am=Al) and the opposition against central rulers by a myriad of
local princes, cities, principalities, and estates (proxied by B). The next section studies how this
basic con￿ ict changes in the presence of external wars.
Before moving on, notice that when B > Rc=Pd - which we assume throughout - Equation (12)
allows us to rewrite the ruler￿ s cost of centralization in the following intuitive way:




with Raut being identi￿ed by (12). The marginal cost of reform c plays a key role in our analysis,
capturing the domestic political cost of state building. A higher c proxies for more severe domestic
divisions B or a lower bene￿t of centralization Rc=Pd, which both reduce autarky revenues Raut in
(12). Depending on analytical convenience we will use the marginal cost c or to the (inverse of the)
autarky reform level Raut as proxies for the domestic cost of state building.
3.4 External Con￿ ict and Incentives to Reform
There are two-countries, ￿home￿H and ￿foreign￿F. At t = 1 they exogenously enter armed con￿ ict
with probability ￿, where ￿ captures the belligerence of the environment. If ￿ = 0; we are back to
autarky; if ￿ = 1; war occurs with certainty. Parameter ￿ captures factors leading to war that are
unrelated to rulers￿economic payo⁄s, such as empire-building motives, religious con￿ ict, dynastic
struggles, and inter-ruler rivarly. Here we assume that these exogenous war triggers always lead to
15con￿ ict. Section 5.2 allows rulers to endogenously choose whether or not to go to war conditional
on the realization of a trigger.
War is costly. It absorbs the ￿scal revenues of both rulers while it is fought, and redistributes
￿scal revenues from the losing to the winning ruler thereafter.11 Denote by RJ the ￿scal revenues
available at t = 1;2 to the ruler of country J = H;F. If at t = 1 there is a war, each ruler spends
RJ to wage it. Thus, greater centralization at t = 0 allows the ruler to have more resources to
wage the war at t = 1. At t = 2, then, the winner is ￿awarded￿the entire revenue RH + RF.
The loser obtains nothing. Due to these assumptions, at t = 0 the consumption of ruler J is equal
to D ￿ CJ(RJ), where CJ(RJ) is the cost of his reform. If at t = 1 war does not arise, this ruler
consumes 2RJ over t = 1;2, just as in autarky. If instead at t = 1 war erupts, the ruler of country
J uses his t = 1 revenues to wage the war; at t = 2 then, he consumes nothing if he loses while he
consumes RH + RF if he wins it.
The war outcome is stochastic. Ruler H wins the war with probability p(RH;RF), ruler F
wins with probability 1 ￿ p(RH;RF). We assume that: i) a ruler is more likely to win if his tax
revenues are higher, for this allows him to ￿nance a larger or better army, but ii) the marginal
return of a ruler￿ s war spending is decreasing. Formally, the contest success function p(RH;RF) is
continuous, di⁄erentiable and features pH > 0, pF < 0, pHH ￿ 0 and pFF ￿ 0, where pJ and pJ;K
(J;K = H;F) denote the function￿ s ￿rst and second derivatives with respect to RH and RF.
The sensitivity of the war outcome to ￿scal revenues, measured by jpJj, is a key determinant
of centralization. A high value of jpJj captures a belligerent environment where money is very
important to win the war. This is for instance the case if creating military strength requires a
ruler to undertake large ex-ante investments to build powerful forti￿cations, acquire sophisticated
and costly equipment (e.g. gunpowder, portable ￿rearms), and to create an expensive organization
to run a larger and more sophisticated military. Money is less important for success if the ￿war
technology￿mainly relies on cheap, standard, technologies and unskilled labour inputs such that -
controlling for the size of the contending countries - ￿scal revenues have a limited impact on the
outcome of con￿ ict. As we will see, in the model we capture the ￿military revolution￿precisely as
an increase in the sensitivity jpJj of the war outcome to ￿scal revenues.
The timing of the model is as follows:
11The assumption that at t = 1 the ruler spends all ￿scal revenues in the war is realistic. During the war there
are few opportunities for the king to spend resources in personal consumption. We have studied the case in which at
t = 1 rulers optimally choose how much to spend in the war and our main results continue to hold, particularly with
the linear contest success function of Section 4.2. The results are available upon request.
16Figure 4 here
Given these preliminaries, in each country the ruler optimally chooses ￿scal revenues RJ by
implementing centralization ￿J = RJ=Rc. The ruler of country H chooses RH so as to solve:
max
RH
￿ ￿ fp(RH;RF)(RH + RF) ￿ 2RHg + 2RH ￿ cH ￿ R2
H, (14)
while the ruler of country F chooses RF so as to solve:
max
RF
￿ ￿ f[1 ￿ p(RH;RF)](RH + RF) ￿ 2RFg + 2RF ￿ cF ￿ R2
F. (15)
In Equations (14) and (15), the war threat (￿ > 0) a⁄ects the bene￿t of centralization relative to
autarky [see Equation (11)] by changing the impact of higher ￿scal revenues on the ruler￿ s utility
at t = 1;2. There are two e⁄ects. First, war creates the risk for rulers of losing their ￿scal revenues
2RJ both in ￿nancing and losing the war. This discourages state building. Second, war creates
the opportunity for rulers to enjoy (RF + RH) in case of victory. This encourages state building.
The marginal cost cJ of centralization does not change with war.12 Crucially, cJ potentially
di⁄ers across countries, owing for instance to di⁄erences in domestic divisions BJ among contestants
(this is in fact the source of heterogeneity that we will focus on) or to di⁄erences in the relative
e¢ ciency of market production Am;J=Al;J. We now study how these forces shape reform.
4 War and State Building
4.1 The Basic Strategic E⁄ects
Equilibrium reforms constitute a Nash equilibrium of the game where rulers choose RH and RF
according to (14) and (15). When the rulers￿objective functions are concave (we focus on parameter
ranges where this is the case), an equilibrium is identi￿ed by the ￿rst order conditions:
cH ￿ RH = 1 + (￿=2)[pH(RH + RF) ￿ (1 ￿ p) ￿ 1], (16)
12There are two reasons for this. First, the war outcome reallocates ￿scal revenues across rulers but does not
a⁄ect the centralization of speci￿c districts. Second, and most important, the powerholders of decentralized districts
are atomistic, which implies that their opposition to centralization does not a⁄ect the outcome of war. Both reasons
imply that individual power-holders have no incentive to change their opposition to centralization in a belligerent
environment, leaving the cost of state building una⁄ected. We can relax these assumptions and show that in this
case the external war threat may a⁄ect the cost of reform without however changing our main results.
17for country H, and:
cF ￿ RF = 1 + (￿=2)[￿pF(RH + RF) ￿ p ￿ 1], (17)
for country F. The war threat (￿ > 0) exerts three direct e⁄ects, which are all included in square
brackets in the above equations. First, it boosts the incentive to centralize because, by increasing
￿scal revenues, centralization enhances the probability of winning the war. This e⁄ect is captured
by the ￿rst term in square brackets (as pH > 0, and pF < 0). Second, war lowers the bene￿t of
centralization by creating the risk that the extra revenues created by reform are lost in the war.
This e⁄ect is captured by the second (negative) term in square brackets and reduces the bene￿t of
reform. Finally, the resource cost of war, which absorbs ￿scal revenues at t = 1, also reduces the
ruler￿ s return from centralization. This is the third (negative) term in square brackets. Overall,
war boosts a ruler￿ s incentive to centralize when the sum of the terms in square brackets above is
positive while dampens it otherwise.
Equations (16) and (17) identify two reaction functions RH(RF j￿;cH ) and RF(RH j￿;cF ) that
link state building in the two countries. These reaction functions depend on the severity of the
external war threat ￿ and on a country￿ s cost of reform cJ, where the latter summarizes political
as well as economic domestic conditions. An equilibrium (R￿
H;R￿
F) occurs where the two reaction
curves intersect. In the appendix we prove:
Proposition 1 If an equilibrium (R￿
H;R￿
F) exists, it is unique. Furthermore:
a) A more severe war threat (i.e. higher ￿) boosts reform incentives in country J = H;F if and
only if war is su¢ ciently sensitive to ￿scal revenues, namely:
dRJ(R￿J j￿;cJ )
d￿
> 0 if and only if jpJj is su¢ ciently large. (18)




c) The reaction functions of countries J = H;F and ￿J 6= J always have opposite slopes, namely:
dRJ(R￿J j￿;cJ )
dR￿J




These results stress, for a general contest success function, what factors shape centralization.
18According to a), the war technology plays a critical role. A more bellicose environment (i.e., a higher
￿), boosts a ruler￿ s incentive to reform if and only if the war outcome is highly sensitive to ￿scal
revenues. This occurs when e⁄ective war-making requires large technological and organizational
investments. When instead these investments are less important at the margin, a higher probability
of war dampens a ruler￿ s incentive to centralize. In the latter case, the ruler realizes that - besides
having a relatively modest impact on the war outcome - the revenue gain created by state building
may be lost in war. This e⁄ect blunts his incentive to centralize.
Property b) says that the incentive to centralize is high when cJ is low. In this case, domestic
con￿ ict is mild and/or market production is very e¢ cient. If instead cJ is high, the incentive to
centralize is small. These e⁄ects arise also in autarky but here they crucially imply that in our
model external war does not automatically transform state building into a common interest public
good. Because atomistic power holders do not have a personal interest in centralization, they
oppose the latter even if external con￿ ict is possible. As a result, external threats can di⁄erentially
a⁄ect state building across countries. The ruler of a divided country may be unable to respond to
external war as much as a more cohesive opponent, reducing the former￿ s incentive to centralize.
Finally, property c) illustrates that strategic e⁄ects introduce yet another source of divergence
in state building. The ruler with a positively sloped reaction function always reacts to stronger
reform abroad by increasing his own reform stance. We call this ruler an ￿aggressive reformer￿ . By
contrast, the ruler with a negatively sloped reaction function reduces his own reform e⁄orts when
reform abroad gets stronger. We call this ruler a ￿timid reformer￿ . This asymmetry in the rulers￿
reaction functions is due to the zero-sum nature of war: the ruler that is, for whatever reason, more
e⁄ective at war will undermine the other ruler￿ s investment in state building. As a result, when
facing a strong contestant a weak ruler ￿gives up￿ , deliberately moderating his own reform stance.
To gain intuition on this e⁄ect, consider Figure 5, which plots the reaction functions of ruler H
and F (together with a shift in one of them).
Figure 5 here
This e⁄ect contributes to creating diverging patterns of state building across countries. Indeed,
suppose that - as in Figure 5 above - the marginal cost of reform falls in the aggressive reformer
H, perhaps because the latter country becomes more cohesive or economically more advanced.
Then, not only does ruler H reform more aggressively but, owing to strategic e⁄ects, ruler F
reduces his reform stance! Here external con￿ ict hinders state building by F and boosts the
19advantage of country H in state building.13 These e⁄ects imply that the presence of a war threat
creates centripetal forces that dampen the e⁄ect of domestic con￿ ict in the aggressive reformer and
centrifugal forces that boost the e⁄ect of domestic con￿ ict in the weak reformer.
To study in detail how the war technology and di⁄erences between countries a⁄ect state building,
we now consider the tractable cases of a linear and a power speci￿cation of the contest success
function p(RH;RF).
4.2 Linear Contest Success Function




+ ￿(RH ￿ ￿RF). (21)
Parameter ￿ captures the extent to which ￿money makes might￿ , i.e. the sensitivity of war outcomes
to ￿scal revenues. As ￿ goes up jpJj goes up for all J = H;F. In addition, ￿ ￿ 1 captures the
military disadvantage of country F with respect to country H (i.e. jpFj ￿ jpHj). Here ￿ is
exogenous, capturing factors such as smaller size (F￿ s army size may be constrained by the number
of men of military age) or worse geography.
We assume ￿￿max[RH;aut;￿RF;aut] < 1, which ensures that the rulers￿objectives are concave.
Then, an interior equilibrium occurs at the intersection of the reaction functions:


















The intercept captures the reform chosen by a ruler when his opponent does not reform at all (i.e.,
when R￿J = 0), the second term captures a ruler￿ s reaction to state building abroad. Note that H,
the country having a military advantage, is the aggressive reformer while F is the timid reformer.
Because the war outcome is more sensitive to ￿scal revenues in H, the latter country can always
undo the e⁄ect of reforms in F by boosting its own reform stance, while the reverse is not true.
We ￿rst study the equilibrium prevailing when both countries are equally e⁄ective at war-
making, namely when ￿ = 1. In this case there is no strategic interaction between reforms in
13Accordingly, if the marginal cost of reform cF falls in the timid reformer, this will not only induce the latter to
centralize more, but it will also boost the state building e⁄ort of the aggressive reformer. Corollary 0 in the appendix
formally proves this statement.
20di⁄erent countries, and we can study the role of properties a) and b) of Proposition 1, abstracting
from property c). In the appendix we prove the following result.








for J = H;F. (24)
The equilibrium (R￿
H;R￿
F) displays the following properties:
i) Centralization ￿￿
J = R￿
J=Rc increases in the sensitivity of the war outcome to ￿scal revenues ￿
for all J = H;F. In country J, centralization increases with the frequency of external con￿ict ￿ if
and only if ￿ is large relative to the marginal cost of reform, namely provided
￿ > 3 ￿ cJ=4:
ii) If centralization is partial in all countries, namely ￿￿














F > RH;aut=RF;aut if and only if cH < cF.
Centralization and the importance of ￿scal resources for war-making are closely related. The
extent of centralization ￿￿
J pursued by rulers increases with ￿, the sensitivity of war outcomes to
￿scal revenues. The higher is ￿, the more state building boosts the probability of winning the war,
and the higher is the bene￿t of reform. If ￿ > 3 ￿ cJ=4, the bene￿t of reform is so large relative
to its cost that the war threat boosts centralization relative to autarky. If instead ￿ < 3 ￿ cJ=4,
the sensitivity of the war outcome to ￿scal revenues is low relative to the cost of reform and thus
centralization is below the autarky level. In this case, external con￿ ict is more of a risk than an
opportunity: the danger that a ruler loses revenues from reform outweighs the potential gain in
income. This undermines his incentive to centralize.
Crucially, result ii) shows that regardless of whether centralization is above or below its autarky
level, the presence of a war threat ampli￿es inequality in state building relative to autarky. If ￿ > 0;
the country where centralization is cheaper (perhaps due to lower domestic divisions and/or higher
productivity of market production) centralizes disproportionately more than its opponent. A higher
￿ greatly boosts the incentive to centralize in the low-cost country because such country is little
21afraid of losing revenues generated by reforms. The opposite is true in the country where the cost
of reform is high. These e⁄ects become stronger as ￿ goes up.
To see the link between domestic con￿ ict, external con￿ ict and reform, suppose that countries
H and F only di⁄er because domestic divisions BJ are higher in F than in H, i.e. BH < BF.
Denote by Raut the autarky reform RH;aut in H. Then, the autarky reform in F is equal to
RF;aut = (BH=BF)Raut. Figure 6 illustrates the pattern of state building in the two countries.
Figure 6 here
The horizontal axis measures the common component of autarky revenue. A higher Raut can
capture a global boost in the e¢ ciency of market production, due to increasing commercialization,
which reduces the marginal cost of centralization cJ = 1=RJ;aut in all countries. The vertical axis
measures the sensitivity of war to ￿scal revenues. When ￿ < 3=4Raut, the military gains from
increasing ￿scal revenue are so low relative to the cost of reform that a race to the bottom prevails:
state building declines in all countries. As ￿ increases above 3=4Raut, the ruler of the less divided
country H can tilt the war outcome in his favour by engaging in state building. In contrast, the
ruler of country F will be reluctant to do because he faces strong domestic opposition. In this
range, the external war threat creates pervasive inequality in state building across countries. As
the sensitivity of war to ￿scal revenues becomes very large, so that ￿ > 3=4(BH=BF)Raut, the war




These results show that - contrary to conventional wisdom - an external war threat does not
necessarily boost state building by increasing competition among rulers. If ￿scal revenues only
change the likely outcome of war by a little (i.e. ￿ is low), external con￿ ict dampens state building
in all countries. But even if external con￿ ict boosts state building (either due to high ￿ and/or
high Raut), it may do so in an asymmetric way, depending on the severity of domestic political
divisions in the two countries. Cohesive countries will have a comparative advantage both in state
building and in war ￿ghting. The rulers of divided countries then give up any attempt to centralize.
Only when ￿ and/or Raut are very large will a more bellicose world produce convergence in state
building across countries.
The case where ￿ = 1 leaves out the strategic e⁄ects of Proposition 1 (property c) and of
Corollary 1. To gauge these e⁄ects, consider the following result:









1 + ￿￿(1 ￿ 2￿)=cF
1 ￿ ￿￿(2 ￿ ￿)=cH
. (26)
As a result, RH=RF ￿ RH;aut=RF;aut if and only if cF=cH ￿ (2￿ ￿ 1)=(2 ￿ ￿). Also RH=RF
increases in ￿ if and only if cF=cH ￿ (2￿ ￿ 1)=(2 ￿ ￿).
If country F is both more domestically divided and weaker in the battle￿ed than country H (i.e.,
cF > cH and ￿ < 1), divergence in state building is very strong. Now, not only does the asymmetry
in reform costs induce H to disproportionately centralize relative to F, but reform in the more
cohesive country H directly dampens reform in F via strategic e⁄ects. This is because, when
￿ < 1, the ruler of country F expects to lose the war with high probability even if he undertakes an
extensive reform, thereby hindering his incentive to centralize. Conversely, if country F is highly
e¢ cient at war-￿ghting (￿ > 1), it may overcome some of the disincentive e⁄ects coming from
having greater internal divisions. The general point of Proposition 3 is that war creates inequality
in state building not only via its interaction with domestic con￿ ict but also via a strategic e⁄ect
due to inequality in the countries￿military prowess. In the previous analysis, such inequality ￿
was exogenous. Now we show that with a power speci￿cation of the contest success function, such
inequality, and thus strategic e⁄ects, are endogenously shaped by domestic political divisions in the
two countries.
4.3 Power Contest Success Function








As before, ￿ ￿ 0 captures the sensitivity of the war outcome to ￿scal revenues. When ￿ = 0 the
war outcome is determined by a coin toss, i.e. p = 1=2. In the intermediate case ￿ = 1 a country
wins the war with odds equal to its relative ￿scal revenue. When ￿ ! 1 the richer country
wins with probability one. Even though the above contest success function is symmetric [i.e.,
p(RH;RF) = p(RF;RH)], the incentive to increase ￿scal revenues can be unequal across countries
because of the nonlinearity of (27). By plugging jpJj = ￿ ￿ p(1 ￿ p)=RJ and (27) into Equations
(16) and (17) it is easy to ￿nd:











Higher ￿ boosts state building if and only if the sensitivity of the war outcome to ￿scal revenues is
su¢ ciently high, namely ￿ > 3. When instead countries are asymmetric RH;aut 6= RH;aut (and
thus cH 6= cF), the unique equilibrium features:
1) R￿
H > R￿
F if and only if cH < cF
2) H is the aggressive and F the timid reformer if and only if cH < cF. If, starting from cH = cF
(and thus RH;aut = RF;aut) the marginal cost of reform cH in H drops su¢ ciently, reform in F
falls below the autarky level, namely R￿
F < RF;aut.
The main ￿ndings obtained under the linear speci￿cation are preserved under the exponential
contest success function (27). In particular, the war threat (￿ > 0) boosts centralization if and only
if ￿ is su¢ ciently large. Equation (28) formally proves this for the case where the two countries are
identical, but the result holds more generally (it surely holds for ￿ = 0), even though we cannot
explicitly solve for the equilibrium when ￿ > 0. It also continues to be the case that the external
war threat exerts an asymmetric e⁄ect across countries, favouring the country with lower domestic
cost of reform, H.
The novel result here is that the country characterized by low domestic con￿ icts does not
only disproportionately reform because it faces a lower cost, but also because - from a strategic
standpoint - such a country is the aggressive reformer. As a result, its reforms cause a reduction of
state building in its divided opponent, which is a weak reformer. To illustrate this possibility, the
￿gure below graphically represents result 2) of Lemma 2.
Figure 7 here
The left panel displays the symmetric equilibrium arising when the cost of reform is identical in
H and F. Here ￿ is assumed to be so high that both countries centralize more than in autarky. As
country H becomes much less divided than country F (see the left panel), H boosts its centraliza-
tion. The resulting negative externality is so strong that in F centralization falls below the autarky
level. Thus, strategic e⁄ects magnify the link between cross country di⁄erences in domestic con￿ ict
and divergence in state building.
244.4 Comment
Our model shows that the presence of an external war threat boosts state building only if ￿scal
revenue has a decisive e⁄ect on success in war. Furthermore, cross country di⁄erences in the level
of domestic con￿ ict may cause divergent patterns of state building, with one country aggressively
centralizing and another being reluctant to do so.
Figure 6 provides one useful way to visualize these e⁄ects. As political entities consolidate and
the world becomes belligerent, three subsequent patterns of state consolidation should occur as a
function of the costliness of military technology. In the ￿rst phase, the sensitivity of war to ￿scal
revenues is low relative to the cost of reform, so that relative to autarky the risk of entering a
war discourages state building in all countries. This regime captures a highly fragmented state
system where the balance of power within political entities is unstable and does not lead to the
emergence of a strong centralized power. As the sensitivity of war to ￿scal revenues increases,
rulers become more hungry for ￿scal revenues in order to respond to external threats. They thus
increasingly centralize their power, by reducing rent extraction by local magnates and streamlining
tax administration. As a result, taxation becomes less distortionary, which may spur growth and
commerce. As the tax base expands, so do the stakes involved in warmaking, further boosting state
building. That is, the increase in the sensitivity of the war outcome to ￿scal revenues creates a
positive feedback mechanism whereby improvements in the e¢ ciency of tax collection reduce tax
distortions, foster growth, thereby begetting wars and further state building.
As the role of money in deciding wars reaches intermediate levels, state building exceeds the
autarky level at least in some of the countries. However, a strong asymmetry emerges whereby the
monarchs of less divided and more developed countries have a disproportionately large incentive
to centralize, which creates strong divergence in state building. This e⁄ect may even encourage
rulers of less powerful countries to drop out of the competition and restrain their state building
e⁄orts. Now the international system consists of politically strong and economically developed
centralized countries and weaker, poorer, less centralized countries. These laggard countries are
unlikely to survive as they increasingly fall prey to the strong ones. Finally, as the sensitivity
of the war outcome to ￿scal revenues becomes very large, all rulers maximally boost their state
building e⁄orts and countries converge to the full centralization benchmark where tax distortions
are lowest and productions is highest.
As we show next, this link between state building and the military technology becomes even
25stronger once one accounts for the rulers￿decision to create institutional constraints limiting their
own prerogatives as well as for the endogenous choice of whether or not to go to war.
5 Institutions and the Decision to Go to War
We now extend our basic setup to analyze: the role of institutions and of institutional change as
well as the endogenous decision by rulers of whether or not to go to war.
5.1 Institutions and Centralization
We view institutions as constraints on the executive (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001), and
we capture them by a ruler￿ s ability to extract resources from power holders. In country J = H;F
institutions set the share (1 ￿ ￿J) 2 [0;1] of tax revenues that the ruler can grab in a centralized
district. The remaining share ￿J of revenue Rc goes to the local power holder. As before, ￿scal
revenues in decentralized districts are retained completely by the power holder. Our previous
analysis boils down to the case of ￿J = 0 in which the ruler is unconstrained. If ￿J = 1, we are
at the opposite extreme where all tax revenues collected in centralized districts go to local power
holders. When ￿J is higher, institutions are stronger, owing to the presence of stricter checks and
balances on the ruler, to the greater power of legislative assemblies, constitutional review, and so
forth.14 We now study the e⁄ect of institutions on state building. Section 5.1.2 instead endogeneizes
the link between external wars and institutional development.
5.1.1 Institutions and the Ruler￿ s Decision to Centralize
Out of a quantity RJ of ￿scal revenues collected, the ruler can only grab e RJ = (1 ￿ ￿J) ￿ RJ for
himself. Over two periods then, the power holder of a centralized district obtains 2￿JRc. This
implies that his loss from decentralization is equal to 2(Pd ￿ ￿JRc), which falls in the strength of
14We solved the model also under the alternative assumption that institutions also contemplate the creation of a
representative assembly of centralized powerholder who can vote to decide whether to give all of their ￿scal revenues
to the central ruler. To implement this case we slightly changed the model (with no consequences for our previous
results) by assuming that local powerholders lose the ￿xed amount L > 0 when their country is defeated. In such
case, for a linear speci￿cation of the contest success function it is easy to show that if a war threat materializes the
assembly will hand all ￿scal revenues to the ruler provided ￿L > 1. In this speci￿c sense, the war becomes a common
public good. If this is the case, the ruler will grab a share (1 ￿ ￿J) of ￿scal revenues in normal times but with
probability ￿ he will grab all ￿scal revenues and invest them in the war. This more nuanced portrayal of institutions
renders the analysis more complicated but does not change our main results.
26institutions ￿J. If




institutions are so strong that local power holders actually gain from centralization! When (29)
holds, there is no political opposition to reform. In this case, the cost of centralizing is zero,
regardless of the extent of domestic con￿ ict. This is because strong institutions commit the ruler
to reach a mutually advantageous revenue-sharing arrangement with power holders. We focus on
the more interesting case ￿J < b ￿J, in which there is domestic opposition to reform and the optimal
reform trades o⁄ the cost of centralization with its bene￿t.
Given these preliminaries, the optimal centralization pattern can be found by replacing RJ with
e RJ in the maximization problems (14) and (15). By noting that ￿J = e RJ=Rc￿J, one then ￿nds
that to obtain a ￿scal revenue e RJ = (1 ￿ ￿J) ￿ RJ the ruler must now bear the cost:
CJ(e RJ) = e cJ ￿ e R2




where, in the spirit of Equation (12):









In our model stronger institutions can be simply conceptualized as a reduction in the marginal cost
faced by the ruler for increasing ￿scal revenue.
In (31) institutions a⁄ect (via the cost of centralizing) the autarky ￿scal revenue in two con-
￿ icting ways. On the one hand, stronger institutions (higher ￿J) reduce opposition to reform,
increasing autarky revenues. This e⁄ect is captured by the term ￿J inside the square brackets. On
the other hand, stronger institutions directly reduce the ability of the ruler to grab ￿scal revenues.
This e⁄ect is captured by the term (1 ￿ ￿J) outside of the square brackets. In the realistic case
where the e¢ ciency gains of centralization are large (i.e. Rc > 2Pd), which we assume through-
out, the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates and better institutions boost autarky revenues. In this case, the
marginal cost of centralization in (30) decreases in the strength of institutions: a higher ￿J com-
mits the central ruler to leave more revenues to local power holders, reducing their opposition to
centralization.15
15In this range institutions are thus ￿win-win￿in the sense that, in the absence of a cost of changing institutions
the ruler should be expected to set them at the maximal value ￿J = ￿
￿
J consistent with full centralization. The
institutional arrangement described in footnote 24 would have di⁄erent, perhaps more accurate, implications. In














namely when institutions in H are strong relative to the intensity of domestic con￿ ict in the same
country. Even if country H is ￿more divided￿than F (i.e. if BH > BF) its ruler can face weaker
domestic opposition if institutions constrain him more than the ruler than country F.
We can exploit Propositions 2 and 3 to see the impact of institutions on centralization. Equation
(25) says that, under a linear contest success function, war ampli￿es di⁄erences in the domestic
cost of reform. That is, the country having relatively better institutions centralizes more than the
country with worse institutions because the cost of reform is smaller in the former country. Under
a power contest success function, strategic e⁄ects reinforce this conclusion. In sum, institutions
support state building in divided societies because it is the presence of strong institutions that
e⁄ectively turns state building into a common interest public good: when ￿J is higher, not only
the central ruler, but also local powerholders, bene￿t from centralization. We now show how these
e⁄ects shed light on the link between external wars and endogenous institutional development.
5.1.2 External Wars, Centralization and Institutional Change
To endogenize institutions we assume that rulers - before undertaking any centralization - can
strengthen their institutions at some cost. As the previous analysis shows, a strengthening in
institutions ￿J is akin to a decrease in the marginal cost of reform cJ. At the outset ￿0;J = 0 and
ruler J can upgrade his institution to a level ￿J > 0 by spending K(￿J), where K() is an increasing
and convex function. This cost of institutional reform is uniform across countries but the bene￿t of
institutional upgrading is country speci￿c, owing to cross country di⁄erences in domestic con￿ ict.
It is this this latter feature that generates institutional divergence.16 Indeed, the Appendix proves
that for any contest success function satisfying the general properties stated in Section 3.3:
Proposition 4 Denote by WJ(￿J;BJ) the equilibrium welfare of ruler J = H;F as a function of
such arrangement the country as a whole would bene￿t from the presence of institutions (as the latter would boost
the ability of the country to respond to external threats), but the ruler would not bene￿t much (and may even lose)
from institutions because local powerholders would prevent him from grabbing ￿scal revenues in peaceful times. As
a result, the ruler would face a private cost of setting stricter checks and balances.
16The notion that K(￿) is the same across countries is not only parsimonious (we already have country varying
bene￿ts) but also reasonable: in our setting both the ruler and local power holders bene￿t from stronger institutions,
so K(￿) captures the pure cost for the ruler to buy a commitment technology.
28the strength of institutions ￿J and of domestic divisions BJ. At a common level of intitutions ￿H =






















To see this result, suppose there is no external war. Now e R￿
J = e RJ;aut and the ￿rst factor
on the left hand side of Equation (33) drops out. The second factor then says that country H
bene￿ts more than F from institutional upgrading if and only if it is less divided than F to begin
with (i.e., if e RH;aut > e RF;aut). In other words, a stregthening of institutions more e⁄ectively
reduces the cost of centralization in a country that has a lower cost of reform to begin with. To
see the intuition, suppose that di⁄erences in the cost of reform are due to domestic divisions.
Then Proposition 4 says that institutional development has only a limited impact in countries
that are highly fragmented (i.e. have higher BJ). This is because marginal improvements in
institutions appease few domestic opponents there. In contrast, in countries where domestic con￿ ict
is weaker domestic opposition is very ￿elastic￿to an increase in ￿J. As a result, an improvement in
institutions greatly boosts state building there. These e⁄ects amplify inequality among countries,
favouring the country characterized by fewer domestic con￿ icts.17
The e⁄ect discussed above deals with the autarky scenario. Suppose however that a war threat
arises. Then, the ￿rst term in (33) does not drop out because e R￿
J 6= e RJ;aut.18 This implies that the
less divided country H becomes even more eager to upgrade institutions relative to F precisely when
the external threat boosts divergence in centralization. That is, provided e R￿
H=e RH;aut > e R￿
F=e RF;aut.
If, by contrast, external wars induce convergence in centralization, they also dampen cross-country
di⁄erences in institutions. In sum, external war threats increase inequality in institutional devel-
opment if and only if they increase inequality in state building.
This result allows us to fully characterize the patterns of institutional upgrading prevailing in
the linear and symmetric contest success function of Proposition 2:
17The uniformly higher elasticity of domestic opposition to institutions in more cohesive countries is due to the
fact that the distribution of ￿ is un￿rom. Of course, this elasticity property no longer holds at corners. For example,
in countries where domestic con￿ icts is so small that reforms are almost always undertaken, better institutions will
play a small role. Recall however that we realistically assued that in all countries con￿ icts are su¢ ciently strong that
in autraky centralization is partial (i.e. BJ > Rc=Pd) and that institutions are su¢ ciently weak that some con￿ ict is
present (i.e. ￿J < b ￿J).
18With respect to the second term, provided the contest success function is symmetric (which is our main case of
study) it is still true that e R
￿
H > e R
￿
F if H is less divided than F. Hence, the second factor in (33) continues to enhance
the bene￿t of institutional upgrading in the less divided country.
29Corollary 1 Denote by ￿J;aut the endogenously chosen degree of institutional upgrading by ruler
J = H;F in autarky and by e RJ;aut and e cJ the associated autarky revenues and marginal cost,
respectively. Denote by ￿￿
J and ￿￿
J the equilibrium centralization and institutions prevailing in
country J when an external threat is present (i.e., when ￿ > 0). We then have
1) Institutions and centralization in J are stronger than in autarky if and only if ￿ > 3 ￿ e cJ=4
2) If centralization and institutions are partial, namely ￿￿
J < 1 and ￿￿
J < b ￿J for J = H;F, the less
divided country has higher ￿￿
J and ￿￿
J than its opponent.
As in Besley and Persson (2010), di⁄erent dimensions of state development - centralization and
institutions - cluster together. In particular, external wars create asymmetries not only in central-
ization, but also in institutional development. Stronger institutions allow rulers to relax domestic
con￿ icts and boost centralization. In a little divided country, institutional upgradings are e⁄ective
at reducing opposition to reform. Thus, the ruler invests in such upgradings, particularly when
he must meet an external war threat. In highly divided countries instead, only large institutional
upgradings can e⁄ectively reduce domestic opposition. This discourages the ruler from undertaking
any institutional upgrading or state building, sti￿ ing all reforms.
Interestingly, the joint pattern of institutional development and state building is shaped by ￿,
the sensitivity of the war outcome to ￿scal revenues. Much in the spirit of Figure 6, when ￿ is low
the external war threat dampens investments in institutions and centralization in all countries. As
￿ becomes intermediate, only the ruler of the less divided country disproportionately boosts his
centralization and institutions, generating strong diveregnce. As ￿ becomes very large, all rulers
face enormous incentives to invest in institutions and state buildings, leading to the emergence
of strong and accountable states. The statistical analysis in Dincecco (2009) - who shows that
centralized and constrained governments in Europe taxed more than fragmented or ￿absolutist￿
entities between 1650 and 1913 ￿is fully in line with the predictions of our model here.
5.2 The Choice to Go to War
In our current model, the features of warmaking are entirely captured by the rulers￿￿scal revenues
(RH;RF), which can be viewed as a proxy for the ￿intensity￿of military con￿ ict, as re￿ ected in
a larger cost, duration and geographical spread of wars.19 The outbreak of war is by contrast
19War obviously becomes more intensive if either RH or RF or both go up. We instead do not specify how such
intensive margin varies if the two revenues move in di⁄erent directions. In most cases, however, in our model both
RH and RF increase in ￿ although there may be diveregnce in the sense that in one country revenues increase much
30exogenous. In reality, both going to war and the intensity of warfare re￿ ect political choices. In
this section we therefore extend our model to analyze a ruler￿ s decision of whether or not to go to
war. This section thus generates predictions on the link between state building and the frequency
of war.
As in the previous analysis, assume that a war trigger arises exogenously with probability ￿.
Both rulers have armies ready to go to war, but now they unilaterally decide whether or not
to do so depending on their economic payo⁄. To make things interesting, we assume that war
destroys a share (1 ￿ ￿) > 0 of ￿scal revenues at t = 2 in all countries. This implies that: i) it is
impossible for both rulers to expect to gain from war, and ii) there may be circumstances where
both rulers lose from the war, so that war does not always occur. In general, when ￿ < 1 it would
be mutually bene￿cial for rulers to renegotiate the war away, but here we realistically assume that
such renegotiations are impossible because rulers cannot commit to make the necessary transfers.
As a result, if at t = 1 a war trigger arrives with probability ￿, two things can happen. First,
both rulers may expect to lose from the war. In this case, military con￿ ict is averted. Alternatively,
either ruler may expect to gain from war. In this case, military con￿ ict erupts. Clearly, this change
in the model setup does not only a⁄ect the frequency of war, but also the ex-ante investment in
state building. Indeed, the incentive to centralize at t =0 will depend on the (now endogenous)
probability of going to war at t = 1.
To see how these e⁄ects play out, let us solve the model backwards. Given the equilibrium
revenues (R￿
H;R￿
F), and conditional on the realization of a war event, con￿ ict occurs either when







or when F bene￿ts from war, namely when:
[1 ￿ p(R￿
H;R￿




War is averted if and only if none of the above conditions holds. Intuitively, (34) and (35) ensure
that a ruler￿ s expected revenue from going to war (the left hand side in the above expressions) is
higher than what he can obtain by taxing only his own economy (the right hand side above).
more than in the other.
31Under a symmetric contest success function [i.e. such that p(R;R) = 1=2], war cannot occur
if countries have identical revenues (RH = RF); in this case, the war prize is awarded with a coin
toss and no ruler expects to obtain from war more than his own revenues (since ￿ < 1, actually
they both expect to obtain less than that). Hence, both rulers prefer a peaceful outcome. The
incentive to go to war instead arises if countries are unequal; in this case, the war heavily favors
one contestant, who is thus eager to initiate con￿ ict. Since inequality in ￿scal revenues is itself
a⁄ected by the patterns of centralization, the probability of con￿ ict and investment in state building
are jointly determined in equilibrium. The Appendix shows that under the linear contest success
function of Proposition 2 the following result obtains.
Proposition 5 Denote by ￿￿ the sensitivity of war to ￿scal revenue at which max(R￿
H;R￿
F) = Rc,
so that for ￿ ￿ ￿￿ state building in the two countries is partial. Then, there exist two thresholds
￿0, ￿1 where 0 ￿ ￿0 < ￿1 ￿ ￿￿ such that, conditional on the realization of a war event:
1) If ￿ ￿ ￿0, war occurs with probability one and the less wealthy ruler expects to bene￿t from it
2) If ￿ 2 (￿0;￿1), the equilibrium is in mixed strategies and war occurs with probability ! 2 [0;1).
3) If ￿ ￿ ￿1, war occurs with probability one and the wealthier ruler stands to bene￿t from it.
This result has several interesting implications. First, war is most likely to arise if the sensitivity
of ￿scal revenues is either high or low. Second, and crucially, the identity of the party initiating
con￿ ict is di⁄erent in these two cases. When the sensitivity of war to ￿scal revenues is high, the
wealthier country is the one initiating con￿ ict. the intuition is that in this case the wealthier
country is disproportionately more likely to win the war. As a result, it is eager to initate con￿ ict.
In e⁄ect, with ￿ high enough, war behaves like a ￿superior good￿ , which is consumed to a greater
extent as a ruler grows his ￿scal resources. When instead the sensitivity of wartime success to
￿scal revenues is low, the less wealthy country is the one initiating con￿ ict. The intuition is that at
low ￿ the less wealthy country wins the war with non-negligible probability, so that the prospect
of conquering a more wealthy opponent acts as an inducement to con￿ ict.
Matters are more complicated when ￿ is intermediate. Relative to the extent of war destructions,
the probability with which either ruler wins is too low for military con￿ ict to be appealing. One
possibility in this range is that war does not occur at all, i.e. ! = 0. In this case, at t = 0 the
rulers invest as in autarky, which is an equilibrium only if in turn, at the autarky revenues, no
ruler has an incentive to go to war at t = 1. If however at the autarky revenues one ruler wishes to
initiate con￿ ict, the equilibrium is in mixed strategies: conditional on a war trigger ￿ war occurs
32with positive probability ! 2 (0;1). The level of ! is then determined so that - at the ex-ante
probability of war ￿ ￿ ! - the optimal investments in state building at t = 0 renders the more
belligerent ruler just indi⁄erent between initiating the war or not at t = 1 (and thus willing to
randomize the decision of whether or not to go to war). Regardless of the speci￿c value taken by !
in equilibrium, the general point here is that at intermediate levels of ￿ the probability of con￿ ict
goes down relative to the case where ￿ takes extreme values.
This analysis has two broad implications. First, the link between the war technology and the
frequency of military con￿ ict is non-linear. War can happen frequently both when the military
techology is highly developed and expensive (i.e. ￿ is high) as well as when it is primitive (i.e.
￿ low).20 Furthermore, when ￿ is so high that both war contenders become fully centralized (i.e.
￿ >> ￿￿), a peaceful outcome also arises. As a result, it is di¢ cult to draw univocal predictions
linking the frequency of con￿ ict, the war technology and state building.
Second, and more interestingly, the decision of whether to go to war or not creates an additional
channel whereby external threats should create convergence or divergence among countries. When
the sensitivity of the war outcomes to ￿scal revenues is low, military con￿ ict is e⁄ectively a mech-
anism allowing weaker powers to bene￿t on average by challenging more consolidated ones. As a
result, when ￿ is low, state consolidation is weak not only because each ruler has little incentive to
engage in state building on his own (as we saw in Section 4), but also because war ￿redistributes￿
￿scal revenues and territories from larger to countries to smaller ones, fostering fragmentation. In
contrast, when the sensitivity of the war outcome to ￿scal revenues is high, military con￿ ict is a
mechanism allowing strong powers to take over weaker ones. As a result, when ￿ is high, state
consolidation is extensive for two reasons ￿￿rst, because each ruler has strong incentives to invest
on his own, and second, because war is likely to redistribute ￿scal revenues and territories from
smaller countries to larger ones, creating further concentration. In other words, our model shows
that the two key paths to the formation of strong states ￿the creation of a centralized authority
and the conquest of weaker countries ￿do not operate independently but are jointly shaped by the
realities of warmaking.
20For ￿ > ￿
￿ the sensitivity of war to ￿scal revenues is so high that the two countries become very equal (both
approaching full centralization), and the incentive to go to war disappears again.
336 Empirical Evidence
We now shed light on the patterns of state consolidation in early modern Europe by focusing on
the two key driving factors of centralization stressed by our model: the increasing importance of
money for determining military success and cross-country di⁄erences in domestic con￿ icts.
6.1 England versus Spain: a study in contrasts
To begin, we compare state building in early modern Britain and Spain. During the period 1500-
1800, both were at one point dominant powers at the height of their in￿ uence; both fought numerous
wars, and both accumulated large quantities of debt. And yet, Spain quickly declined as a European
power, while Britain dominated the European concert of powers for centuries and assembled the
greatest empire in history.
While many scholars have examined the success of Britain and the failure of Spain, the diver-
gence in state capacity deserves to be underlined. Spain during the 16th century was the superpower
of its age. In 1550, it had more men under arms than any other power in Europe. At its height, un-
der Philip II, the empire was so large that the sun literally never set on it. And yet, Spain declined
quickly as a European power. By 1700, a mere century and a half after its apogee, its armed forces
were less than half as big as they had been in 1550. In Spain, some of the earlier successes in
state-building had gone into reverse by the 17 century; the country￿ s decline as a European power
paralleled the reduction in ￿scal and other resources of the Crown.
As predicted by our model, internal fragmentation was a key constraint: Castile was heavily
taxed, but other regions hardly contributed at all to Madrid￿ s revenues. Spain failed to overcome
this challenge. Aggressive attempts to levy taxes outside Castile typically came to nothing (such
as, for example, under the Count-Duke Olivares during the Thirty Years War). Cities and entire
kingdoms successfully claimed tax exemptions. Not even the Crown￿ s monopoly over military
resources was successfully asserted: By the 17th century, the arsenals of grandees, such as the one
of the Duke of Medina-Sidonia, were once more su¢ cient to equip a small army (Anderson 1988).
Britain, on the other hand, gradually evolved into a highly centralized and e⁄ective state.
Armed force was concentrated in the hands of the central authority. Taxation became uniform and
relatively e⁄ective. Total revenue surged as the Customs and Excise took over the collection of
indirect taxes after the 1690. Eventually, Britain introduced the ￿rst successfully income tax in
history. Its ￿nances were also solid enough to sustain an enormous accumulation of debt ￿over
34200% of GDP by 1820. During the period 1500 to 1815, England went from marginal player to the
dominant power in Europe, largely as a result of its superior ￿scal capacity (Brewer 1988, Ferguson
2002). The Royal Navy ruled the sea; it eventually built the largest empire in history.
Figure 8 here
As Figure 9 illustrates, despite the greater underlying heterogeneity of Spain, the two countries
were similarly e⁄ective at raising revenues in 1500. Strong divergence between Britain and Spain
only emerged in the second half of the 17th century, which is precisely when the military revolution￿ s
e⁄ects became particularly strong. Although both countries faced the same increase in the cost of
con￿ ict, the consequences were quite di⁄erent.
Consistent with our model, di⁄erences in internal fragmentation became problematic for Spain
precisely when state capacity became crucial for military success.21 We emphasize the importance
of starting conditions. Spain emerged from the Union of Crowns, joining Castile and Aragon ￿just
as Britain emerged from the Union of Crowns between Scotland and England. In the British case,
however, an Act of Union followed the Union of Crowns ￿Scotland was integrated into Britain
administratively, in terms of taxes, and in terms of jurisdiction.22 Even at the beginning of the
early modern period, the kings of England faced a much less fragmented and heterogeneous realm
than their competitors on the Iberian peninsula. Apart from Wales, cultural and linguistic frag-
mentation was relatively limited; cities were not represented directly in parliament. In Spain, every
Royal territory continued to have its own laws, customs barriers separated Madrid from Pamplona
and Barcelona, and many veto players insisted on their ancient freedoms. Indeed, constitutional
theory in many parts of the peninsula held that the king￿ s position depended on the upholding of
medieval customary rights. In this way, new laws and edicts that tried to reduce privileges could
be legitimately ignored by o¢ cials and citizens alike. One ready indicator of fragmentation is the
ease of rebellion. While England succeeded in extending tax jurisdiction to Wales and Scotland,
Castile failed at the same task. When a serious attempt was made (under Olivares, the so-called
"Union de Armas"), armed rebellion in Catalunya, Portugal, and Naples followed. Even if only
21Here, we di⁄er from the classi￿cation in Dincecco (2009), who characterizes Britain before 1690 as centralized
and absolutist. For our purposes, fragmentation in tax collection - with delegation of tax powers to the cities - is what
matters, and it was broadly similar in Britain and Spain. Only after the introduction of the Customs and Excise
does the collection of indirect taxation become more centralized.
22Several provisions of the Act of Union were actually ignored, such as tax exemptions and special rules for the
kirk.
35one of these succeeded, the centralizing agenda in Spain su⁄ered a permanent setback. Rebellious
territories, even after being defeated, kept most of their ancient rights. As John Elliott (1969) put
it: ￿Such strength as it [the Spanish Monarchy] possessed derived from its weakness.￿ 23
Consistent with our model, the divergent paths of England and Spain also hold a lesson about
the co-evolution of institutional change and state building. England￿ s ability to raise revenue was
not impressive until after the ￿Glorious Revolution￿in 1688 (North and Weingast 1989). We are
not the ￿rst to note that the 1688 allowed a ￿grand bargain￿ to be struck between Crown and
parliament, allowing more oversight and control by the latter in exchange for far greater revenue-
raising by the former. By strengthening constraints on the executive in a fairly uni￿ed country,
the optimum rate of centralization actually increased markedly. Our model o⁄ers a perspective for
why this bargain could be struck ￿and why it resulted in much greater ￿scal centralization and
revenue raising ￿in England than elsewhere.
In sum, the contrast between Spain and England o⁄ers powerful support for the predictions of
our model. Faced with the same shock - the rise in the cost of armed con￿ ict due to the Military
Revolution - one of them succeeded in building a centralized, highly capable state apparatus, while
the other failed. Di⁄erences in starting conditions, especially in terms of initial fragmentation, were
crucial for divergence.
6.2 The Military Revolution, Fragmentation and State Building in Early Mod-
ern Europe
We now provide some statistical evidence on the mechanism highlighted by our model for a cross
section of early modern European countries. The goal of this analysis is not to identify the causal
impact of the changing war technology and domestic divisions on state building, but rather to
assess whether the basic correlations in the data are consistent with our theory.
6.2.1 Money and military success
We ￿rst provide some evidence on the changing importance of money for military might by analysing
data on the outcomes of 153 major battles in Europe between 1500 and 1780. We focus on this
period since it encompasses the entire period of the military revolution and the centuries during
23In the 18th century, the Bourbon kings made another attempt at centralization. While they succeeded in
eliminating ancient "freedoms" in Catalunya, they did not succeed in permanently centralizing and consolidating
power. For example, internal customs barriers were quickly re-erected (Grafe 2011).
36which state consolidation in Europe got under way. The data are from Jacques (2007), combined
with ￿scal data from Karaman and Pamuk (2010).24 For each battle, we code the outcome as
either success or defeat. For each combatant state, we collect data on total tax revenue, as well as
revenue per capita at the nearest available point in time.
Table 3 here
A simple way to present results is given in Table 3. We show the number of battles won by
the richer power (in terms of total revenue), as well as the odds ratio, for four periods: i) the early
modern period as a whole, ii) before 1600, iii) from 1600-1700 and, iv) from 1700 to 1780. In the
century after 1500, ￿scally stronger powers actually did not win battles more often. Only 8 out of
19 battles, equivalent to 42% were decided in their favour. This translates into an odds ratio of
0.72, where 1 would indicate an even chance of winning. By the 17th century, the odds of battle￿eld
success have moved decisively in favour of the ￿nancially stronger powers ￿the odds ratio has risen
to 1.8. It continues to be far above unity in the 18th century (1.49), even if it is not quite as strong
as before.
Table 3 examines the odds of the richer contestant winning without measuring the revenue gap
between contestants. To account for this latter aspect, we next estimate the likelihood of success
for the ￿scally stronger power as a function of the revenue ratio between both sides, the presence
of allies, and the nature of the engagement:
SH;t = C + b ￿ ￿
RH;t
RL;t
+ ￿ ￿ AH;t + ￿H;t (36)
where SH;t is a dummy variable equal to unity if the stronger power wins, and zero otherwise, C
is a constant, AH;t is a dummy indicating the presence of allies on the side of the ￿scally stronger
power, and
RH;t
RL;t is the ratio of the ￿scally stronger power￿ s total revenues to those of the weaker
power. The coe¢ cient b ￿ captures the importance of money for winning a war, providing a proxy
for the sensitivity of war outcomes to ￿scal revenues ￿ in our model.25
We estimate a linear probability model under OLS; results are substantially unchanged if we
use Probit estimation. Table 4 gives the results. Except in the case of naval engagements before
24The Revolutionary Wars with France after 1793 were fought according to rules that di⁄ered markedly from those
before, and we chose not to include them. The massive use of troops from conquered territories (which remained
nominally independent) as well as the complex ￿scal transfers during the period would complicate the analysis.
25Equation (36) holds almost exactly (up to the revenues of the allied) in the power speci￿cation of the contest
success function.
371650 - of which there were few - the intercept is always close to 0.5, indicating that without taking
￿scal variables into account, the likely outcome of a battle is well-approximated by a coin ￿ ip.
Crucially, the estimated coe¢ cient ￿ changes substantially over time. Before 1650, there is no
evidence of a clear e⁄ect of relative ￿scal strength on battle￿eld success. If anything, the coe¢ cient
is negative, but insigni￿cant. This is true for land battles, naval engagements, and all battles
combined. After 1650, the coe¢ cient becomes positive, and signi￿cantly so for land battles and for
the sample overall; for naval battles, it becomes much less negative. The size of the e⁄ect is also
meaningful in military terms: A one st.dev. increase in the revenue ratio increases the chances of
battle￿eld success by approximately 11 percentage points.
Table 4 here
We therefore ￿nd that after 1650, battle￿eld outcomes became much more sensitive to the
relative economic strength of the belligerents. This is consistent with the basic driving force behind
state building in our model: an increase in the sensitivity of the war outcome to ￿scal revenues.
6.2.2 Fragmentation, the Military Revolution and state building
The main empirical prediction of our model concerns the link between a country￿ s ability to raise
taxes and the underlying heterogeneity of the population, interacted with the military revolution.
We use two measures of heterogeneity ￿Alesina et al.￿ s (2003) measure of ethnic heterogeneity,
and the number of predecessor states on the territory of each country. Figures 11 and 12 give an
overview of the cross-sectional correlation between revenue per capita (in grams of silver per capita)
and two measures of internal fragmentation. Each observation is labelled by country:
Figures 9 and 10 here
As is readily apparent in Figure 11, countries with high levels of ethnic heterogeneity had
relatively low levels of revenue per capita in early modern Europe. Homogenous countries￿level of
revenue varied, but the only ones with very high levels of output per capita display a high degree of
homogeneity. The same is true for the second measure of hetereogeneity - the number of predecessor
states in 1300 on a state￿ s territority. We can also see that the trade-o⁄ between heterogeneity and
revenue becomes steeper over time, as countries with lower levels of hetereogeneity are successful at
raising more and more revenue. At the high-heterogeneity end of the spectrum, on the other hand,
38revenues either stagnate (as was the case in the Ottoman Empire) or they show no clear pattern
over time (Spain).
We now examine the connection between the ability to raise revenue and ethnic heterogeneity,
with an eye to how this link changes as the military revolution unfolds over time. In table 5, we
estimate models of the type:
Ri;t = C + ￿ ￿ Bi;t + ￿Dpost1650 + ￿Bi;tDpost1650 + ￿i;t
where Ri;t is revenue per capita - as a measure of ￿scal capacity -, Bi;t is our measure of heterogeneity
(ethnic fragmentation or the number of predecessor states), Dpost1650 is a dummy that takes the
value of unity if observations are from years after 1650, and zero otherwise.
In Table 5, we use both of our measures of fragmentation. In panel A, we examine the e⁄ect of
ethnic heterogeneity; in panel B, the one of earlier territorial divisions.
Table 5 here
In the full sample, we see that states with a higher degree of ethnic fragmentation had much
lower revenue collection per capita on average (regression 1, panel A). A one standard deviation
increase in heterogeneity (0.108) is associated with revenue per capita that, on average, is lower by
14.8 grams of silver, or 36 percent of the average. In columns (2) and (3), this e⁄ect is shown to be
mostly the result of developments after 1650. Before that date, heterogeneity only seems to have
a mildly negative e⁄ect on a state￿ s ability to tax. After 1650, the size of the coe¢ cient jumps to
204, suggesting that a one st.dev. increase in heterogeneity is associated with 42% lower revenue
per capita. Column (4) demonstrates that the interaction e⁄ect between the measure of ethnic
di⁄erences and time is signi￿cant.
If we use data on the number of predecessor states, broadly the same pattern emerges. Countries
that "inherited" numerous territorial divisions from the recent past had, on average, lower revenues
(regression 5). Before 1650, the e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cant but relatively weak; thereafter, it
becomes stronger. Regression 10 shows that di⁄erences between the period pre- and post-1650 is
statistically signi￿cant.
Which states are capable of raising taxes to the greatest extent? Our model predicts that
having a homogenous population should make the process of building a state capable of taxing large
quantities easier. This is also what the data con￿rm. Interestingly, the e⁄ect of fragmentation ￿
39measured either as ethnic heterogeneity or as territorial fragmentation ￿becomes stronger and more
signi￿cant after 1650, i.e. during the period when our earlier results indicate that the bene￿ts of
money in terms of the chances to win in war matter more. Our empirical results therefore support
the following story: States begin the period with a wide variety of tax systems, yielding di⁄erent
quantities of revenue. As success in battle depends more and more on ￿nancial resources, all states
try to tax more. They succeed to a di⁄ering extent ￿states that are relatively homogenous to start
with raise revenue easily; those that face a highly fragmented populace face major challenges, and
succeed much less.
7 Conclusion
Centralized, powerful states are a relatively recent invention in the history of mankind. In many
parts of the world, states do not have a monopoly of violence, collect only a small share of GDP
as taxes, and provide few essential services. To understand how state capacity came to be high in
some countries, we analyse the origins of European states in the early modern period. We build
a model that is designed to give insight into the process by which these powers eventually build
large, e¢ cient, centralized states. We emphasize the importance of internal centralization, which
went hand-in-hand with consolidation of hundreds of states and statelets into a small number of
highly successful states. We also shed light on the transformation of the European state system
that allowed a handful of consolidated states to emerge.
In our model, princes consider whether to invest in state capacity - centralizing tax collection,
wresting control over tari⁄s and the judiciary from local princes, etc. Powers di⁄er in their pre-
existing levels of fragmentation. Without the threat of war, princes have to trade o⁄ the gains in
terms of revenue against the threat of rebellion. A highly fragmented territory requires a lot of
e⁄orts to become uni￿ed; a more uniform state will have the same bene￿t, but requires less time
and e⁄ort in investing in ￿state capacity￿ .
The threat of war changes the calculus. On the one hand, monarchs now have to fear that
they may be attacked, and territory (and treasure) taken from them. This reduces their incentive
to invest in state capacity, since the gains may be smaller than in autarchy. At the same time,
the need to ￿ght wars makes money more valuable. This increases the incentive to invest in state
capacity, by strengthening the tax bureaucracy, etc. How strong these two e⁄ects are depends on
i.each power￿ s initial fragmentation ￿shorthand for the threat of revolt ii. how costly wars are.
40Everything else equal, expensive wars make it more attractive to invest in centralization.
During the early modern period, the cost of war kept increasing - armies grew in size, equipping
them became more costly, and wars lasted longer. In our model, at some point, war is so costly that
at least the stronger, more centralized power ￿nds it worthwhile to augment state capacity because
of the threat of war. The weaker power, on the other hand, will simply invest less, and may drop
out of power competition altogether. As the cost of war increases even further, the importance
of money for survival starts to outweigh the dangers of rebellion. Therefore, when wars are very
costly, both the uni￿ed and the fragmented power invest in state capacity.
We apply our framework to the case of early modern Europe. Successful states tore up the
ancient "liberties" of towns, clergy, and the nobility, ignored laws based on custom, imposed legal
norms uniformly, and abolished tax exemptions. By 1800, a patchwork of small and weak states
had consolidated into a few, powerful entities that enjoyed a monopoly of violence internally, ju-
risdictional unity, and the power to tax on a vast scale. We argue that Europe￿ s rise to global
domination after 1500 re￿ ects a benign externality of the intense struggle for supremacy in Europe.
The exogenous shock that set o⁄ the rise of European state capacity was that wars became ever
more costly after 1500, as a result of the "Military Revolution". As the cost of con￿ ict rose, rulers
needed to tax more and centralize revenue collection to ensure their independence. Weaker powers
increasingly dropped out of the competition and often disappeared from the map, leaving the ￿eld
to their more potent competitors. In this way, our model explains how, in response to the rising
cost of con￿ ict, average state capacity in Europe grew dramatically, while only a few consolidated,
powerful states survived.
Our model also explains how the growing importance of ￿scal revenue for success on the bat-
tle￿eld helped to improve institutions. Where rulers could commit to revenue sharing with local
power holders, resistance to reform and centralization was weaker. Under ideal circumstances, this
led to the creation of a "consensually strong" state (Acemoglu 2005), which becomes centralized
and powerful precisely because the ruler is constrained. We interpret the rise of Britain after 1689
in this light. In this sense, the rapidly rising cost of naval warfare increased the importance of rev-
enue generation for the monarch. Initial levels of fragmentation were low, and centralization could
proceed apace - resulting in such advances as the highly e¢ cient customs & excise administration,
and the ￿rst successful income tax in history - because crown and parliament could strike a deal
that led to constraints on the former, while permitting an unprecedented rise in the percentage of
output appropriated by the state.
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46Tables
Table 1: Frequency of War
Century Number Average Percentage years
of wars duration (years) under warfare(%)
16th 34 1.6 95
17th 29 1.7 94
18th 17 1 78
19th 20 0.4 40
20th 15 0.4 53
Source: Tilly 1990
Table 2: Army size in Early Modern Europe (in 1,000s)
1550 1700 1780
army navy total army navy total army navy total
England 41 25 66 76 115 191 79 109 188
France 43 14 57 224 118 342 183 85 268
Dutch Republic 90 86 176 27 22 49
Spain 145 18 163 37 26 63 64 62 126
Austria 9 0 9 62 0 62 253 0 253
Prussia 37 0 37 181 0 181
Russia 52 0 52 408 19 427
Ottoman Empire 90 50 140 130 30 160 120 30 150
Table 3: War and ￿scal resources (land battles only)
richer wins?
Y N odds of success (richer power)
1500-1780 81 59 1.36
1500-1600 8 11 0.72
1600-1700 18 8 1.8
1700-1780 55 37 1.49
47Table 4: Battle￿eld success and relative ￿scal strength
1 2 3 4 5 6
type of engagement Land battles Naval battles All battles
years < 1650 >=1650 < 1650 >=1650 < 1650 >=1650
Revenue ratio -0.04 0.078* -0.22** -0.017 -0.11 0.07*
(0.07) (0.044) (0.08) (0.095) (0.07) (0.04)
Allies 0.46** 0.46** 0.105 na 0.32* 0.14**
(0.19) (0.2) (0.32) (0.18) (0.09)
Naval 0.04 0.1
(0.2) (0.09)
C 0.35** 0.53*** 0.92 0.92** 0.48** 0.55**
(0.16) (0.08) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.08)
N 25 107 9 31 34 138
R2 0.15 0.07 0.45 0.0012 0.15 0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
48Table 5: Revenue raising and fragmentation
1 2 3 4
PANEL A: Ethnic Heterogeneity full pre1650 post1650 interaction
Heterogeneity -134.6* -0.0992 -203.8* -0.0992





C 67.55*** 18.39 91.46*** 18.39
(15.38) (10.88) (20.82) (10.66)
N 58 19 39 58
R2 0.08 0 0.135 0.214
5 6 7 8
PANEL B full pre1650 post1650 interaction
#of predecessor states -2.3*** -0.65* -3.01*** -0.65
(0.53) (0.36) (0.7) (0.35)
Post1650 59.13**
(16.8)
# of predecessor states*Post1650 -2.5***
(0.79)
C 66.5*** 25.99*** 85.12*** 25.99***
(11.45) (8.34) (14.5) (8.2)
N 58 19 39 58
R2 0.22 0.12 0.31 0.37
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
49Figures
Figure 1: Number of Battles in Europe per Century
Figure 2: Fiscal Revenue in Europe, 1500-1780
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Figure 3: Army Size from Augustus to 1944
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Rulers invest in fiscal
capacity RH, RF
Y(RH),Y(RF) is  produced ,
revenues RH  and RF  are
distributed to the rulers.
a) If there is nowar, the ruler
consumeshisrevenueRHorRF.
b) If there is a war, the ruler
uses his revenueRH or RF for
military expenses.
Y(RH),Y(RF) is produced
Each ruler consumes  his
revenue RH or RF
The winning ruler consumes
RH + RF,  the  losing  ruler
consumes nothing.
Figure 4: Timing
51Figure 5: The e⁄ect of a reduction in the cost of reform cH in the aggressive reformer H:
Figure 6: Capital Intensity, Domestic Con￿ ict, and State Building
52Figure 7: Symmetric case RH;aut = RF;aut = Raut (left panel) and asymmetric case RH;aut >>
RF;aut = Raut (right panel)
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54Appendix 1: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that all power holders except i follow the taxation strategy
(￿l;d;￿m;d). Regrdless of what the others do, with respect to local production, the power holder of
district i will optimally extract all surplus by setting ￿l;i = (Al ￿ Ah)=Al. With respect to market
production, power holder i renders its undertaking pro￿table by setting:
(1 ￿ ￿m;i ￿ ￿m;d)Am = Ah, (37)
which implies a tax rate b ￿m;i = [(1 ￿ ￿m;d)Am ￿ Ah]=Am and a tax revenue for the power holder
equal to:
2b ￿m;iAm = 2[(1 ￿ ￿m;d)Am ￿ Ah]. (38)
If instead the power holder sets ￿m;i > b ￿m;i, everybody engages in local production and the power
holder￿ s revenue is:
￿l;iAl = (Al ￿ Ah). (39)
The power holder prefers to discourage market production (i.e. to set ￿m;i > b ￿m;i) if and only if
(39) is above (38), which is the case when:
￿m;d > ￿m;d =
2Am ￿ Al ￿ Ah
2Am
. (40)
Two points are noteworthy. First, ￿m;d > (Am ￿ Ah)=2Am (for Am > Al). Thus, there is always
a symmetric equilibrium where ￿m;d = (Am ￿ Ah)=2Am and all engage in market production.
However, there are in￿nitely many symmetric equilibria where ￿m;d > ￿m;d. In these equilibria,
market production is over.taxed and all engage in local production.
Proof of Proposition 1. Denote by ￿j(RH;RF) the payo⁄ of ruler j = H;F. The rulers￿￿rst
order conditions then equal to ￿
j
Rj(RH;RF) = 0 for j = H;F, which give rise to Equations (16)
and (17). These conditions guarantee an optimum if the problem of the rulers is concave at the
equilibrium, namely if ￿
j
RjRj(RH;RF) < 0 for j = H;F, which become:
(￿=2)[pHH(RH + RF) + 2pH] ￿ 1=RH;aut < 0, (41)
(￿=2)[￿pFF(RH + RF) ￿ 2pF] ￿ 1=RF;aut < 0, (42)
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(￿=2)[pHF(RH + RF) + pH + pF]
j(￿=2)[￿pFF(RH + RF) ￿ 2pF] ￿ 1=RF;autj
. (44)






















(1=2)[pH(RH + RF) ￿ (1 ￿ p) ￿ 1]
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F) can be identi￿ed by the equation:
f1 + (￿=2)[￿pF(RH(R￿
F) + R￿





which is obtained by replacing H￿ s reaction function RH(RF) into (??), together with R￿
H =
RH(R￿
F). Consider the value of the left hand side of (47) at the boundaries. Since p2 ￿ 0, when
RF = 0, the left hand side is positive. When RF (RH(Rc)) < Rc the left hand side of (47) is
negative at RF = Rc. In this case, a unique equilibrium exists if and only if (47) is decreasing. To
see that this is indeed the case, rewrite (47) as ￿F
RF(RH(R￿
F);R￿
F) = 0. Then, by exploiting (43)














dRF < 0 and ￿F
RFRF < 0. As a result, if an equilibrium exists,
it is also unique.
Proof of Corollary 0. The statement of the Corollary is: A higher RJ;aut increases reform R￿
J
in country J. If
dRJ(R￿Jj￿;RJ;aut )
dR￿J > 0, then a marginal increase in RJ;aut decreases reform R￿
￿J in
country ￿J while a marginal increase in R￿J;aut increases reform R￿
J in country J. The proof of
























































































> 0. Clearly, dRH
dRH;aut > 0, dRF
dRF;aut > 0, and dRH
dRF;aut > 0 if
and only if
dRH(RF)
dRF > 0, while dRF
dRH;aut < 0 if and only if
dRH(RF)
dRF > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. In this and the remaining proofs, we will always replace the marginal








which a maximum provided ￿ < b ￿ ￿ 1=￿maxJ RJ;aut. We will always consider the case where ￿
is su¢ ciently low that in the range of variation of ￿ of interest [the one where not all countries
have fully centralized, formally minJ R￿
J < Rc] the condition is always met. We also focus on the
case where the probability of either ruler winning is interior, which is guaranteed by the condition
￿(maxJ R￿
J ￿ minJ R￿





RJ;aut) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿RH;aut)(1 ￿ ￿￿RF;aut), (53)
which we also assume by focusing on similar country pairs (i.e. where maxJ RJ;aut ￿minJ RJ;aut is
small). If the two countries are su¢ ciently similar, condition (53) is ful￿lled for all ￿. The remining
properties then follow by inspection of the ￿rst order condition.
Proof of Proposition 3. When ￿ ￿ 1;by solving for (R￿
H;R￿
F) using the reaction functions,









1 + ￿￿RF;aut(1 ￿ 2￿)
1 ￿ ￿￿RH;aut(2 ￿ ￿)
. (54)
The other properties follow by inspection of the above equation.
Proof of Lemma 2. By using j@p(RH;RF)=@RJj = ￿￿p(1￿p)=RJ, (27), the ￿rst order conditions
become:
R￿
























￿ p ￿ 1
￿￿
.











The remaining properties follow by the proof of Proposition 1 and by inspection of the above
conditions.





pJ(e RJ; e R￿J)(e RJ + e R￿J) ￿ 2e RJ
o
















2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿J) ￿ 2Pd=Rc
[Pd=Rc ￿ ￿J](1 ￿ ￿J)
,























Proof of Corollary 2. By inspection and using the notions developed in the Proof of Proposition
2.




























Given the symmetry of the contest success function, (58) can be used to study under what conditions
does the stronger or weaker ruler wish to initiate a war.
Suppose in fact that H is the stong ruler, namely R￿
H > R￿
F. Then (58) becomes:
￿￿(R￿
H + R￿










Given the dependence of (R￿
H;R￿
F) on ￿ in Proposition 2, it is easy to see that the left hand side
increases in ￿ over the range where R￿
H;R￿
F < Rc. De￿ne ￿￿ as the sensitivity at which R￿
H = Rc.
Then, if ￿￿Rc > 1=2 there exists a b ￿ < 1 such that, for ￿ ￿ b ￿, there exists a ￿1 < ￿￿ such that
for ￿ ￿ ￿1 condition (59) is met. If ￿￿Rc < 1=2 or ￿ < b ￿, then set ￿1 = ￿￿. Clearly, even though
￿1 < ￿￿, for ￿ > ￿￿ the distance R￿
H ￿ R￿
F becomes smaller and smalle, so that at some point,
when ￿ becomes large, (59) is violated.
Suppose now that F is the weak ruler, namely R￿
H < R￿
F. Then (58) becomes:
￿￿ (R￿
F + R￿










Given the dependence of (R￿
H;R￿
F) on ￿ in Proposition 2, it is easy to see that the left hand side
decreases in ￿ over the range where R￿
H;R￿
F < Rc. When ￿ = 0, the value of the left hand side is
￿nite. As a result, there exists a b b ￿ < 1 such that, for ￿ ￿ b b ￿, there exists a ￿0 such that for ￿ ￿ ￿0
condition (60) is met. For ￿ < b b ￿, set ￿0 = 0.
We thus have seen that in ￿ 2 [0;￿0] [ [￿1;￿￿] war occurs for sure and the optimal ￿scal
investments of Propositions 2 indeed characterize the full equilibrium. Suppose now that we are
in ￿ 2 (￿0;￿1). Here our goal is not to fully derive the mixed strategy equilibrium but describe
how the equilibrium works. In this range, at the ￿scal investments of Proposition 2, countries have
no incentive to go to war. How is an equilibrium determined in this case? Suppose ￿rst that for
￿ 2 (￿0;￿1) the equilibrium probability of war is ! = 0. In this case, countries go back to the
autarky investments (RF;aut;RH;aut). If at these investments no country has an incentive to go to
59war, then the equilibrium is one where for ￿ 2 (￿0;￿1) war does not occurs and country behave
as in autarky. It is easy to check that if this is the case, then ￿0 = 0. The logic is that, again by
Proposition 2, state building (and asymmetry among countries) fall in ￿. As a result, if no ruler
has an incentive to ￿ght in autarky, when ￿ = 3=4RJ;aut, a fortiori no ruler has any incentive to
￿ght for ￿ = 0, for in this latter case countries are even more equal. In sume, if ! = 0, war only
arises for ￿ 2 [￿1;￿￿].
If instead at the autraky investments either ruler has an incentive to go to war, then in equi-
librium the probability ! of going to war must be positive. Crucially, since autarky revenues are
too high (and unequal) to avert war, it must be that a positive probability of war (! > 0) reduces
state building in the two countries, much in the spirit of Proposition 2 for ￿ < 3=4RJ;aut. From an
ex-ante standpoint, an overall probability of going to war of ￿! induces (according to Proposition
2) optimal investments [R￿
F(￿;!);R￿
H(￿;!)]. The equilibrium is then reached by setting ! such
that, at the equilibrium probability of H winning p(R￿
F(￿;!);R￿
H(￿;!)), the party who at autarky
revenues is willing to attack is just indi⁄erent between attacking or not (and thus willing to mix
with probability !).
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